The following diary of NSA staff meetings and NSB investigation January 30, 1967 to February 19, 1967 was kept by NSA staffer Larry Rubin. This was the period in which the NSA-CIA ties were exposed. He had released it to the College Press Service, an organ of the U.S. Student Press Association to be made available for discussion by delegates of this Congress. It is being distributed by staff of the WASHINGTON FREE PRESS.

Larry Rubin resigned his position as Educational Affairs Director of NSA last March to voice his opposition to the lies and secrecy of the witty NSA staff to their own membership and even the rest of the NSA staff. As he wrote to U.S. Student Press Association:

The basic story is this. When the officers of NSA found out about the RAMPARTS article, they, and a few others from NSA, held secret meetings with Bob Kiley, Harry Lund, and other CIA agents. These meetings started in the middle of January, 1967. The CIA and NSA, together, decided that they had to admit to the fact of the relationship, but they would lie about the nature of the relationship.

The lies were as follows:
--- All subsidy ended in 1967. In fact, the NSA had a new grant for $50,000 from the CIA, which Gene Groves helped negotiate when he took office. That is, Groves negotiated the terms, Sherburne had negotiated the grant itself.
--- The CIA paid for Tim Bradbury's trip to Vietnam. In fact, Rick Stearns sent Tim to a CIA agent, Harry Lund, for a briefing before he left.
--- The NSA was not used as spies. The officers put this lie immediately after they found out about the RAMPARTS ad that pre-empted the story. The staff got furious about this and in the final statement by the NSB, they admitted the spying.
--- The rent on the building, of course, was being paid for by the CIA.
--- The senior officers initially denied to the staff that their response to the RAMPARTS article was being worked out with the CIA. Later they admitted this to the press.

These are Larry Rubin's personal notes. No editing has been done. They are reproduced from a handwritten copy, just as we received them. Collegiate Press Service will be pleased to help report any other differing point of view which also hasn't received proper publicity.

Appended is the first press release, to which Rubin refers, issued by NSA following the disclosure.
In morning: Gene Groves tells everyone important meeting at 4:30. Will not tell us what it's about, but says we must attend.

4:30

Gene Groves: reads from prepared notes, explaining to us that Ramparts magazine, in its March issue will carry a story alleging that "NSA was a CIA front," and that the rent now was being paid by the CIA. Most of staff giggles, and makes remarks to affect that this will be just another attack from Left.

Al Milano to Groves: Is the story true?

Groves: We (the officers) are not sure. We are checking it out.

Rubin: How?

Groves: By talking with past officers.

Groves explained that the current administration was the Liberal Caucus, and therefore was not on good terms with past administrations, who were more conservative.

The past administrations had not told the present one too much about the organization's past connections.

Groves assured us that no one in the present administration had had dealings with the CIA.

Ed Schwartz describes how the officers found out about the article:

When he visited Bereley the previous week (During the crisis there) he was approached by a member of Ramparts staff, who insisted that he (Ed) come to Sol Stern's house. (editor of Ramparts.)

Stern told Ed about the forthcoming article, and asked Ed to corroborate the story. Ed refused, telling Stern that he couldn't corroborate it or deny it because he was not sure of the facts.

Ed told us that Mike Wood, a past staff member of NSA, had given the story to Ramparts. Ed implied that Wood told lies to Ramparts to get back at NSA for firing him at the beginning of the year.

Ed said that Wood had worked for NSA for two years as Director of Development, and was fired for incompetence. Wood was bitter, Schwartz said.

Gene and Ed asked us not to tell anybody about the forthcoming article, and assured us they would handle the situation.

Most of the staff members left the meeting feeling that the article probably wasn't true.

Evening: I speak to Ed alone in his office.

Rubin: I feel sick and shocked. What do you think about all this?

Schwartz: Be calm, we don't know if the facts are true.

I told Schwartz that if the facts were true, I might not remain with NSA, depending on the organization's response to the facts.

1-31-67

I suggest to Gene that I see Marc Raskin, the Director of the Institute for Policy Studies. I am a close friend of his, having once worked at the Institute. Gene thinks that might be a good way to find out exactly what Ramparts has in mind.
I talk with Marc. He assures me that Ramparts has done a thorough research job on NSA, and that the fact of the CIA-NSA relationship is true.

I try to convince him that if the facts were true, the present officers had nothing to do with the relationship.

He tells me he is going to write the editorial for Ramparts, and discusses it with me. The basic point: NSA relies on Government money for its support. Therefore, it opens itself wide for subversion from the outside, and tends not to be an independent voice of students. The only safeguard against such things as CIA inroads is an organization which depends solely on students for its money.

I suggest he talk to Gene and Ed about this. I call them over.

Gene, Marc, Ed and I discuss the Ramparts article and the possibility of funding NSA from students.

Gene and Ed repeat that they do not know whether or not NSA received funds from the CIA and say they are looking into it.

Gene: (We cannot rely on students for funding because)... the reason NSA is effective is because it keeps channels open to Government and professional groups. We can maintain these channels because we receive grants from the Government. We'd lose our credibility with the power structure if we refused Government grants.

We discussed the question of the building, briefly. If it was true that the rent was being paid by the CIA, should we move out? Marc said we should. Gene said we couldn't because we had no place to go.

Night:

I talk to Gene, alone. I asked him what he would do if the facts showed that the relationship existed.

Gene: I've been considering everything from complete denial to complete admission, and everything in between.

Gene told me he was going to Europe the next week to see if our representatives there had heard about the article, and to see what effect upon their programs they believed it would have.

2-1-67

Ed Schwartz and I continue discussion with Marc along same lines as yesterday.

2-6-67

Night:

Walter Senterfitt, Director of our Tutorial Assistance Committee, returns from San Francisco, where he has spent a week with Mike Wood. He says that there will be a staff meeting the next day to discuss the Ramparts article.

He says: A lot of the staff seem to realize by now that the last meeting was phony.

2-7-67

Staff meeting: Led by Ed Schwartz and Walt Senterfitt, Gene Groves not present as he is preparing to leave for Europe the next day.

Senterfitt Report: "I have seen the research memos that back up the Ramparts article, and I am convinced it is true."

Senterfitt gives about ½ hour description of the article. The basic points are:
NSA has been receiving funds from the CIA for about 15 years.

At times, the CIA had supported up to 80% of NSA's total budget.

The present comptroller, Ed Wallace, had been trained by the CIA to work for NSA and had previously worked for the CIA in another CIA front.

The primary conduits for CIA to the NSA had been the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs (FYSA), and the Independence Foundation, although over the years more than 20 foundations had acted as conduits.

FYSA and Independence had financed the International Student Relations Seminars (ISRS) had each summer.

Two years ago, it was decided to discontinue the ISRS, and instead Independence Foundation promised to buy a building for NSA in Washington (at that time NSA headquarters was in Phila.) They are presently paying the rent on the building. Harry Lund, the head of FYSA, and a CIA operative (also a past officer of NSA) bought the building, sold it to a major Washington bank, took out a 15-year lease on it for NSA. The rent is now being paid by Independence Foundation.

The CIA worked closely with the International Commission. The IAUP would always sign the security agreement, and the CIA would help choose the overseas reps.

At times, overseas representatives would send reports on the activities of Latin American, African, and Eastern European students to the CIA.

At times, they would carry out assignments directly for the CIA, such as infiltrating groups in Latin America, or giving certain speeches at various conferences.

The CIA would suggest programs that NSA should carry out.

The height of CIA influence was in the early 60's when they were supporting about 80% of NSA's total budget. NSA almost went bankrupt in '63 and the CIA got it out of the red.

During this period, CIA people attended most International Commission meetings (at the headquarters in Phila.) Some of the meetings were actually led by CIA people, who would directly tell the I.C. staff what they could or could not do.

Most of the activities involved Latin America.

Phil Sherburne, president of NSA, had told Mike Wood of the CIA-NSA relationship. He was forced to because Wood was hired to help NSA get more grants. All prospects for grants written by NSA people were supposed to pass through him. He received many grants from the International Commission staff, which he considered to be poorly written, and he sent them back to the staff for re-working. The staff complained to Sherburne. The prospects were just for form. The grants were all being given by the CIA, and were guaranteed. The International Commission resented having to do unnecessary work, and asked Sherburne to get Wood off their back. So Sherburne told Wood the truth.

All past Presidents and International Affairs Vice Presidents had signed a National Security Oath, handed them by the CIA which made them liable for prosecution if they revealed the relationship. Sherburne had broken the oath. The present officers had not signed, because they had been trying to break the relationship.
Rubin: (Jumping up) Does that mean that the officers did know about the relationship, when they told us they didn't?

Schwartz: I must explain something. Gene and I had long arguments about what to tell the staff. He convinced me it was necessary to keep tight control over the info., because if it got out now there would be repercussions against our representatives around the world, and against people who worked with us in the past. When Walt came back from Calif, he convinced us it was necessary to tell the staff the whole truth.

Ed explained he had known about the relationship before he ran for office this past summer. He heard about it through rumours at the Congress, and Sherburne confirmed it. Also, he and Sherburne told Gene. He decided to run for office anyway.

Ed: Walt told more than I wanted. I'm telling you, I feel a conflict between the agreement I had with Gene to hold this meeting, and not tell as much as was told, and my inclination to tell all.

Al Milano: I resent your attitude that you're doing us a favor by telling us the truth.

This remark was echoed by several staff members.

Ed: Shouts--Resent it or not, I had promised Gene not to tell everything. Gene was afraid a staff member'd tell the public. I'm warning you, if anyone here tells anybody what he heard, there will be trouble.

Milano: That's ridiculous. We have to tell our friends to prepare them for what's coming.

Rubin: I'm sorry Gene is not here. I'm surprised that so many staff members don't seem to care about the fact they've been lied to.

Arguments back and forth. In the end--Ed says he will work on a statement to the press and present it at a staff meeting tomorrow. Discussion of building.

In order to prevent "lack of communication" again, Ed agrees to hold daily staff meetings.

2-8-67

7:30--Staff Meeting:

Senterfitt tells more details:

---International Student Congress of which we're a member, is a CIA front.

---Sol Stern getting nervous about NSA pre-empting story, so is himself thinking about pre-empting.

Schwartz: I want staff's opinion on public statement.

---Staff asks questions about Ed and Walt's opinion on the effect the revelation of NSA-CIA relationship will have on campuses.

Answer: probably not too great.

Staff members give opinions as to type of statement NSA should make:

Speak one at a time:

Rose Ann Alderson: Reject past--I'm uncertain about what we should say about building--don't pre-empt because we won't look intelligent.

Steve McNichols: Concede truth of past--don't dwell on it--emphasize good things NSA has done. Must take "measured response" approach.
Dave Steinberg: Emphasize we're the liberals who have criticized the International Commission over the years.

Phil Holland: Admit relationship, state what we're doing to cut off.

Rubin: "I'm sick at the whole approach we're taking. We're just worried about our Public Relations. Instead of that, let's discuss how NSA got into this in the first place, and how we're going to get out. Let's discuss getting all our funds from students.

Walt Senterfitt: "We must act now in such a way as to be credible in the future. We can help other organizations prevent this from happening to them.

Emphasize that Phil Sherburne wanted to break relations, but couldn't publicly.

Al Milano: Pre-empt Ramparts on their editorial -- we should begin discussion of how to change NSA.

Julius Lobin: Let's go to outside experts for help.

Darcy Paletz: We should not pre-empt, because then we would be in papers three times -- before, during, and after Ramparts.

About 6 other staff members expressed opinions -- but all the same as one or more of the above.

After we went around table, discussion of who talks to press. Agreement that only Ed does, since he is only officer in Washington at time.

One staff member said: Let's emphasize fact we're just naive kids who were inexperienced and got trapped by CIA.

Steve McNichols: We should call in the NSB (National Supervisory Board) right away. We should also call an emergency national Congress.

Ed: We must keep tight control over information.

2-9-67

Ed has written first draft of statement. Makes remarks before reading it to us:

"You must understand our bind. It is clear, now, that the CIA has gotten our draft deferments for us in the past. There was a man in the CIA who acted as a liaison between us and the White House who got our deferments for us.

If we blast the CIA in our statements, we will lose our deferments. We can't have an organization without staff, and we can't have staff without deferments."

Rubin: I thought you said the CIA did not get our deferments for us this year.

Schwartz: Yes. Phil Sherburne worked it out with Hubert Humphrey.

Bart: our information tells us that if we blast the CIA we will still lose our deferments.

Also -- we must be realistic. There are many people in Government and in private foundations who have worked with the CIA from time to time. They would resent it if we came out against the CIA strongly. They'd think: "What are those bunch of kids doing? Here the CIA has given them money over the years, and they throw it back in their faces."
We lose faith among people in power.
Ed reads statement. Major points:

1. We have heard about Ramparts article alledging relationship--it is persuasive.
2. We deny being used as spies.
3. We have cut subsidy.

Schwartz explains: We'll say Ramparts said we had a relationship. That's different from our admitting outright. We must deny spying to maintain goodwill of State Department.

Al Milano: Ed, goddamn it, you have completely ignored our opinions of yesterday. Every staff member said we should directly admit to the relationship.

Rubin: We are lying in that statement -- we do know the relationship existed.

Chuck Hollander: I haven't said anything up until now. It seems to me our hang-up is this: Do we serve our student constituency by telling the whole truth, or please our Government constituency. Man, the Government has the bread. We must stick with the bread.

Ed: There are eight members of our staff who presently have draft deferments. Not all are present. How can we make decisions that will affect their future?

Dave Steinberg: I don't believe that power structure is monolith that will stamp down on us. I believe that some parts will support us if we come out against the CIA.

People give examples for and against point that parts of power structure will give support if come out with full truth.

Ed promises to write new statement.

Rubin: What the hell is Groves doing in Europe. We know that members of the ISC are CIA agents, and that the overseas reps cooperated with the CIA. What is he talking to them about?

Staff members support question--Schwartz ignores.

Schwartz: Says it would be false to "dump on CIA" because: "A lot of NSA people apparently were very willing to enter relationship. We got alot out of the CIA."
Schwartz told that the CIA gave individuals up to $5,000 more salary, extra travel credit cards, and credit cards for fancy hotels. "The CIA didn't exactly force the caviar down our people's throats."
"I used to wonder why the International Commission people lived so high. Now I know."
"A lot of NSA people went on to work full-time for the CIA. You can't say they were "dupes."

Most of discussion at meeting about statement. None about house cleaning.
2-10-67

Ed and I fly to Montgomery, Ala., for Southern Regional Conference. Ed repeats to me his fears of loosing support from power structure if we fully admit. Ed says also: "If we spill all beans in public, I'm afraid we will hurt some good things CIA is doing.

At night: Ed tells Bill Roberts, head of Southern Project, and Bennie James, Regional Chairman about forthcoming article. Explains reason for secrecy.

2-11-67

During meeting I chaired, someone asks about rumour regarding article. Roberts and James and I deny any knowledge.

2-13-67

Groves came back from Europe last night.
I meet with him--ask him what he discovered.

"Everyone says there will be grave international repercussions. If the whole truth comes out NSA people overseas, and people in governments unfriendly to U.S. who have worked with NSA in past will be hurt."
"I arranged to get Pulvers (NSA rep. in Poland) out before the word reached Poland."

Groves tells me he spent morning with Harry Lund, head of FYSH and CIA agent. I wonder why, but don't express it to Groves.

About 1:30--Staff meeting:

Led by Groves and Stearns, IAUP. Schwartz absent.
Groves gives report from Europe--reiterates what told me in private. Tells staff he is "in communication" with Katzenbach at State Department, and that there is a "possibility" that "I might get the CIA to publicly admit they financed the NSA," but this will entail not telling the whole truth to the press.
I am in the back of room, pacing back and forth.

Rubin: Gene, I'm sorry you weren't here a few days ago. The staff agreed that no matter what, we want to tell whole truth. First, I want to say this to your face: Why did you lie to us about your own knowledge."

Gene: I had to, because we had to get Pulvers out of Poland before he was hurt by Poles finding out.

Rubin: Ed said we had to lie to protect our money. I want to know about our present complicity.

Milano: Wait! Gene, you've lied to us. We don't want that kind of crap anymore.

Gene: (His head in his hands): Look, I really don't know what to say--I won't apologize.

Steinberg: Okay, what was done in the past is done. Now Gene is being completely honest, right?
Rubin: I want to know about Wallace, Kovacs and Witherspoon. What are we going to say about them?

Groves: We won't say anything because we don't know for sure.

Rubin: But Senterfitt said that Ramparts proved to his satisfaction that they had worked with the CIA.

Gene: I don't know that for certain because I haven't heard it from them.

Somebody said: "ask them."

Gene: It wouldn't do any good, because if they were, they wouldn't tell me. There isn't any way to check. Anyway, I don't want to check. I won't witch-hunt.

Rubin: There are ways and you know it. You're saying that you'll say nothing about them because you don't know the facts, then you say you'll refuse to give the facts.

A lot of staff members press Groves and Stearns to find out facts. I give speech about how we must clean house.

Gene: Don't worry, boys, we'll all save our draft exemptions. I'm working it out with some people.

A discussion about pre-emption ensued. Groves pushed for pre-emption, and everybody agreed. It was agreed that he would write a statement and we would discuss it at a meeting the next day.

After meeting, a group of us talked and expressed anger at Groves avoiding the question of present staff members.

About ½ hour after meeting was over, Gene got a call from Neil Sheehan, of the Times. He tells Gene Ramparts placed an ad in the next day's papers exposing NSA. He asked Gene for comment. Gene told him he would give one later.

The following I learned the next day from several staff members:

After the call, Gene ran out of the office, telling people he was going to eat lunch and figure out what to tell Sheehan.

Later, he calls office-- says he can't say where he is. Stearns is with him. Leaves phone number in case of emergency. Senterfitt recognizes number. It's Bob Kiley's house (head of Covert Actions No. 5 of CIA).

Stearns and Groves finish statement there, at Kiley's house, and phoned it in to Times and Post.

That night, I had everybody else on staff come to office--most of us are mad, after we read Groves' statement. Especially on these points.

---It slandered Ramparts.
---It justified CIA-NSA relationship.
---It lied when it said NSA were not used as spies.
We milled around Groves office.
"It's a travesty."
"I don't know if I can work here any longer."
"You absolutely ignored the staff's suggestions."

Several staff members prepare new statements, although Groves already had phoned it in.

Groves yielded to pressure to adopt a new statement, to be given to the press from then on—but insisted it had to contain:

---A statement implying good will on the CIA's part originally.
---A statement that we "had ended all subsidy" in 1967.

When I pointed out this was a lie, Gene said that although the CIA had given us a grant for 1967, and was paying the rent on the building, this was not subsidy in a technical sense. I walked out of room.

2-14-67

Clint Devoe, and Sam Brown, members of the National Supervisory Board arrive.

Newspapermen are swarming around the office. The staff is getting more and more angry at the answers the officers are giving. They feel the officers are whitewashing the CIA-NSA relationship.

Dave Steinberg and I call an emergency staff meeting, to discuss what to do. Groves is present.

Rubin: We called this meeting, Gene, because we're disgusted. At every point, you told us that, finally, you were being honest, and then we learn something new. Yesterday you said you were being honest, then it turns out that you and the CIA had worked out your statements together. Why didn't you tell us you were working with the CIA?

Groves: I couldn't. Look, they agreed to make a public statement admitting the relationship.

Milano: What did we agree to?

Gene: Nothing.

Milano: That must be bullshit. (Turns to staff) --How can you take this crap! (He walks out).

Rubin: Why did we lie in the statements?

Gene: So the CIA would publicly admit the relationship.

(Note: The next day, I read the CIA statement. They lied by saying that they exercised no control over the organization. NSA has never publicly contradicted this.)
Gene goes through routine of how we'll save our draft deferments and funds by cooperating.
I protest continued covert relationship, and ask that we tell press right away. This is ignored.

I ask about the building, and two present staff members. This is not discussed.

Sam Brown, chairman of the NSB, comes in. He says he has called on all other members, and they should be arriving shortly. He says that since the NSB is the legally constituted body of NSA, no statements should have been made without them. He says that the NSB is going to hold a 3 day full investigation of the whole matter, and will start the next day.

2-15-67

International Inn: NSB investigation starts.

For first 3 hours, there is a debate about the NSB issuing a statement condemning the officers for holding secret meetings with the CIA and being in collusion with them about what press statements to make.

Finally, Ed Schwartz threatens to quit if he is criticized publicly. Gene and he explain the dangers of a full disclosure. The NSB votes 7-3 against issuing a statement. In fact, they issue a statement praising the officers.

Several members protest that the NSB should issue no statement until the investigation is over. But the officers insist on putting on a public display of unity.

The first witness is Phil Sherburne, last year's President. He testifies for 3 hours. The rule is made that no notes shall be taken during any of the testimony, in order to prevent press leaks. We also had to agree not to tell the press anything. The following is just the general outline of what Sherburne said:

The CIA practically controlled NSA for the past 15 years.

---They manipulated election of officers. The CIA financed and participants, organized the discussions, and from these choose people they felt should run for office, and weed out those they felt were unsuited. They ran security checks on many people, before they chose them to run for office.

CIA operatives during and after the ISRS, would convince one or two of those they felt were good to run for President and IAUP. They would then convince whichever caucus was most likely -- conservative or liberal -- to back the candidate. During the annual National Congresses, which were always held right after the ISRS, CIA operatives, and some students who they would convince to help them, would campaign for the candidate by means of politicking among the delegates, and monopolizing the few microphones which were always scattered around the room, and were the only means to communicate to the body as a whole. The CIA would always convince the delegates that the position of IAUP needed an "expert" and only those who attended the ISRS had the expertise. They would also use personality factors for or against candidates. If there was a candidate running of whom the CIA did not approve, they would say he was "unstable."
---The CIA paid many officers and overseas reps extra salaries.
---The CIA agents who worked with NSA would generally be ex-NSA officers themselves. They would present themselves as liberal-minded people. They were always young, and would build strong personal relations with the NSA staff.
---Sherburne re-iterated what Senterfitt had said regarding the great control the CIA had over the International programing. He specifically said that the Algerian Student Exchange program, where Algerian students would study in the U.S., was a CIA program. Many of the CIA programs were concerned with Latin America, and quieting down the anti-American reaction that came as a result of the anti-Cuban stance of the U.S.
---From time to time, people would work for the NSA as a "cover" for the CIA. They would be CIA agents working in the NSA. Although most people would be primarily NSAers who worked only partly for the CIA.
Sherburne could not give an exact figure as to the number of people in NSA who worked primarily for the CIA.
Sherburne was asked many questions trying to get him to state specifics, but he always refused, claiming that since he had broken the security agreement he was liable for prosecution and that his lawyer had advised him to be careful about what he said now.
Sherburne stated that a lot of funds had been given that were used in National programming as well as International.

Lee Webb testimony:
(Webb was one of those who did research for the Ramparts article.)
The only new fact he stated was that the Association's attorney, a Mr. Bebcheck, had signed the security oath. Groves was asked if he would comment on this. He refused.

2-16-67

During testimony of Gene Groves, it developed that he had the power to turn down two grants from the CIA which were given to be used this year:
---1. $50,000 grant from FYSA which presently pays for the salary of the controller and the IAUP.
---2. A grant to finance Tim Bradbury's trip to Vietnam, also from FYSA.
After deliberations with the CIA (Kiley), Groves decided to accept the money.
Before Tim Bradbury left for his trip, he spoke with Harry Lund, of FYSA and the CIA, to get "advice."
Rick Stearns told how John Gerhardt also went to the CIA for "advice" this year before he left for Africa.

2-17-67

The N.S.B. issues statement, stating in more detail the CIA-N.S.B. relationship, but still not mentioning the fact of CIA-NSA collusion in response to Ramparts.
2-19-67

I speak with Ed Schwartz at Crystal City Restaurant. I tell him I'm disappointed at NSA's public response. I tell him I would like to leave Washington for a week, to decide what to do. We get into an argument regarding the CIA. In order to show me that the CIA is a "bunch of liberals," he tells me the following:

"During our strategy meetings, they never threatened us." (I didn't press him on this, altho it was the first I had heard of the "Meetings.")

Also, in order to show me how much the officers were wary of the CIA, he told me that Groves had negotiated with Kiley, of the CIA, regarding the extent to which Mal Kovacs, overseas rep in London, would do CIA work this year. Last year, he did quite a bit of work. This year, as a result of the negotiations, he will do less.

2-27-67

Afternoon:

I explain why I am thinking about quitting (The reasons stated in the letter of resignation.) I demand that he tells me right then about these "strategy meetings."

"There were three meetings with the CIA and State Department that I attended. Two before the first meeting with the staff, and one sometime after."

They were attended by: Kiley, Schwartz, Senterfitt, Groves, Phil Sherburne, among others.

(I am amazed that Sherburne attended. He is supposed to be under attack by the CIA. But it seems he had a lot to do with setting up the meetings in the first place.)

Schwartz tells me that at these meetings, the CIA and NSA decided on their general approach to the revelations.

I told him that I felt strongly that these meetings should be revealed in order to "dissociate NSA with its past covert activities."

Schwartz screamed: "You're a moral puritan, which now makes you a moral pervert." He accused me of wanting people to lose their draft deferments and creating a situation where we'd be sending NSA staff to die in Vietnam.

"If keeping the CIA meetings secret means I'll save one person's draft deferment, I'll keep those meetings secret."
FOR RELEASE: FEB. 14th AM's

STATEMENT

It has come to our attention that the March issue of Ramparts Magazine will include a lengthy story alleging a relationship between the International Commission of the National Student Association and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The officers of USNSA first learned of the story through Mr. Michael Wood, a former employee of the Association, and through direct approaches by members of the Ramparts staff. At one point, Ramparts offered USNSA its mailing list for fund-raising purposes if its officers "corroborated" its story, and threatened "the destruction of USNSA" if the officers failed to do so. Since these initial conversations, numerous past employees of USNSA have been presented with similar offers. Many have been asked "to clear themselves" or suffer personal attack in the article.

We do not know the specific allegations of the Ramparts article. It is impossible therefore to determine the truth or falsity of specific charges. It is true that a relationship between USNSA and the Central Intelligence Agency has existed for a considerable period of time. It is important that the exact nature of this relationship be publicly defined to prevent the malicious damage to the integrity of individuals or organizations which will result from erroneous speculation. It is also important that the attitude of the leadership of the National Student Association be made clear, and that the actions of the leadership over the past two years to terminate this relationship be brought to light.

The exact nature of the relationship has been:

1) The officers of the Association did know that funds were received which originated from the CIA.
2) Individual employees or officers of the Association did not at any time, and we state this emphatically, serve any "intelligence" function. No information of a sensitive nature was ever made available to any government agency.
3) USNSA did on any number of occasions present its views to the US government, it insisted strenuously on these views, often to the detriment of its own popularity in government circles.

In the early 1950's USNSA and the US government agreed it to be in the best interests of all involved to make it possible for American students to be represented abroad and to work with student groups in emerging countries. At that time it was important to obtain funds from private groups to support these goals. During this period the officers of the association felt that the existence of heavily financed and totally controlled Soviet front organizations in the international student field made it imperative that democratic and progressive organizations maintain a presence abroad which would offer an alternative.

During the past two years the officers have believed that a covert relationship with government offices was intolerable to an open and democratic organization. An obligation and trust to the students of the nation and our own personal principles demanded that such a relationship be terminated and that all sources of funding be open. The leadership of the Association has always sought alternative sources of funds for its International activities. Over the past two years the officers have felt that it was imperative to rely exclusively on such alternative sources. The government has agreed with our views and has cooperated fully in our efforts.

MORE...
Those of us who have devoted a year of service to the National Student Association have not been engaged in intelligence operations, but have been committed to the improvement of the American university and to the furtherance of the cause of students. In our dealings with campuses in this country and with students abroad we have tried to be open and honest as to our positions, our programs, and our goals. We have felt that these qualities are essential to our organization's strength.

Indeed, it is these qualities which have attracted thousands of students on our member campuses, past and present, to the National Student Association. We have insisted that delegates to our Congresses be elected, or appointed, through democratic procedures on each campus, we have taken pains to ensure free and open debate at all meetings conducted by our organization. The positions of our Congresses are published for anyone to read; the mandates of the constituency are carried out by officers and staff under the direction and control of the National Student Congress and elected National Supervisory Board.

As for the policies of the Association, the record speaks clearly and consistently for itself. USNSA was the first student organization to oppose McCarthyism in the 1950's. We have urged complete Academic Freedom on the campus and freedom of speech in the public. We have urged abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and repeal of the McCarran and Smith Acts. In every area, we have upheld the right of citizens to maintain integrity in his beliefs.

Further, the integrity of the delegates to the Congress has often led them -- as the real voice of NSA -- to uphold positions which subjected the organization to attacks. In the 1950's, at a time when the country's foreign policy reflected an anti-communist fervor insensitive to the needs of many areas of the world, USNSA supported a nuclear test-ban Treaty, the development of democratic institutions in Spain, Portugal, and other autocratic countries, whether in the East or in the West. We have stood against imperialism, against totalitarianism, and against relations between East and West.

At times when domestic policy was insensitive to the needs of many segments of our society, USNSA supported Civil Rights, broad programs of social welfare, the development of community, and a number of other steps necessary to the alleviation of suffering on our society.

For these stands, and the programs which developed out of them, we have been the main target of student and professional right, which has launched a major campaign to destroy us. The Association has at the same time been attacked by the extreme left. We have survived these campaigns.

Extremists of all kinds have attempted and are attempting to destroy the Association presently because it has maintained since its inception its integrity as the representative of the highest aspirations of the American student community.

Yet the battle has been far from easy; what we need now is support -- not simply for USNSA, but for the needs of students. For years we have heard that ours is the most exciting generation in American history. Our organization has tried to fulfill the highest aspirations of that generation even in the face of strenuous attacks. Our ability to survive, and to succeed, depends foremost upon the support of those students whom we have tried to serve. We are confident of that support. Yet it also depends upon the commitment of those who say they applaud the activities of youth to support those activities directly. Now is the time to do so.

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